What Makes Barth's thought Dialectical?

Since Bruce McCormack's work on Barth, one should read Barth less as a representative of neo-orthodoxy and more of a modern/orthodox thinker.  Kenneth Oakes recently even sees no problem in calling him orthodox/liberal because of Barth's continual use of the theoretical format he learned from the Neo-Kantians and Wilhelm Herrmann specifically.

McCormack has insisted that Barth was a dialectically critical-realistic (Realdialektik) theologian.  God's existence is the transcendent real that humans come in contact in a dialectically veiled/unveiled revelation with God as both the Object (Sache) and Subject of the matter.  Barth interpreter Paul La Montagne lists 7 points to illustrate what exactly this means:

1. Barth takes God's existence and God's self-revelation for granted.
2. His theology is nonfoundationalist (not anti).
3. His theology is critical and self-critical (This is a KEY point often ignored by Barth's readers).
4. We cannot speak of God, but we refer to God in our theology.
5. Our knowledge of God is mediated and indirect.
6. Our language of God is fallible; it is actualistic witness at its best.
7. Theology as a science is of a hypothetical character.

Barth's Nietzschean View of History

I am half way done with Richard E. Burnett's book Karl Barth's Theological Exegesis.  The main reason I am reading this book is because he spends a fair amount of time describing what Barth's reading style (his hermeneutics) is like.  He does this by seeing Barth's Romans (I and II) as breaking from the hermeneutical tradition of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey and also the higher criticism of his contemporaries.

The Eureka moment I had is when Burnett pointed out that Barth quotes (in his unpublished preface to Romans) Nietzsche's book The Use and Abuse of History.   Here is the quote (see page 114):

"You may only interpret the past out of the highest power of the present: only in the strongest efforts of your noblest qualities will you divinize what in the past is great, worth knowing and preserving.  Like through like!    Or else you will pull the past down to yourself!  It is the mature and preeminent man who writes history.  He that has not passed through some greater and nobler experience than his contemporaries will be incapable of interpreting the greatness and nobility of the past. The voices of the past speak in oracles; and only the master of the present and the architect of the future can hope to decipher their meaning."

This helps one of my recent points (which is probably not too original) that Barth follows in the genealogy with Nietzsche's and Burckhardt's school of history.  For these three, they held a skeptical view of the progressive reading of history at the end of the nineteenth century, and they wanted a separation between science (its appeal to objective, detachment) and the other disciplines in the humanities.  Following this quote, Barth appeals to Nietzsche in the way the dynamic between the past and present is important for practicing history; thus, their is no detachment with regard to the past.

My article on Barth and Zizek in new Vol 6:1 (2012)

My article on Barth and Zizek and Dialectical Theology is now in the new Zizek journal.  Check it out!!!

http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/360/431

It's all Nominalism's Fault???

Part of my dissertation preparation is to read as many books on the "theological" origins of modernity like the recent books by Michael Allen Gillespie and Joshua Mitchell.  In other words, to look at books and essays that note how important religious issues were at the beginning of modernity until the present.  Even the Enlightenment itself was a contest of competing religious options and not simply the triumph of science and rationality over superstition (even though it was probably the French that popularized this particular narrative).

I guess in some cases of popular wisdom, religion has ceased to be a major factor in the continual quest of Western societies quest for modernization.  However, research has shown that the narrative that says religion will be passed by because of growing secularization is a myth.

Now the more and more I read about this issue, the more and more I come to the conclusion that 1) religion is here to stay because it is adaptable (much like many other things in society-see Giddens post on tradition) and 2) in many cases, the religious element has learned to correspond with the secular elements quite well.  In short, it is a very complex relationship between the secular and religious forces.

The problem with books by theorists like Gillespie and others is the need to boil down this complexity to a single, overarching problem.  He claims that it was the Nominalism of Ockham, later inherited by Luther, that led Western society into secularization.  Now Gillespie joins a host of other thinkers (not typically historians, I might add) like Milbank and the RO, who lay blame for modernization at Nominalism.

A recent discussion with George Hunsinger led me to see this move toward the Nominalist bogeyman to be a traditionalist account of modernization.  In other words, when one pulls out the Nominalist card it usually is a catchword for "Catholic" defense of religious traditionalism where the Church is still the controlling center of society (I detect even some of this in Protestant thinkers like Pannenberg).  The fact that modernization and secularization has decreased religious influence in society is frowned upon by many of this group, but I think otherwise.  There is still religious influence in society, sometimes it crosses over the church/state borders, but again, I think that is due to its complexity and in a democratic society with competing structures, it is up to its subjects to work the messiness out.

Finally, of course Nominalism had a part to play in the beginning of modernity, but I do not think it had the central part.

Bruce McCormack on Why Barth is Orthodox and Modern: 2 Parts

As I begin work on my Comprehensive Exams, one of the main figures under review is the work of Princeton's Barthian scholar Bruce McCormack.  His work has been crucial in my own understanding of Barth's theology.  One of the main things I am studying is the historiography of Barth's interpreters.

One term McCormack challenges about Barth's interpretation is the label "neo-orthodox".  This term seems to be the one given to Barth and other diverse thinkers like Tillich, Bultmann and Bonhoeffer by North American readers trying to place these figures somewhere between conservative (or orthodox) and liberal (or modern) theology.  What this term does not take into account is that Barth's theology is "working under the conditions of modernity" or that his is a "variant" within the framework of modernity.  For example, McCormack makes the point that many take it for granted that Barth works with a Kantian epistemology and a Hegelian ontology (while adding his own theological spin).

Modernity, for McCormack, is the time period in Western society when a "historical consciousness" was on the rise.  This went along with Kant's critique of pure reason and its limits and the eventual rise of the romantic movement.  What this means is that the turn to history and the social-cultural setting as context meant the rejection or at least the suspicion of classical metaphysics (including Christian ones).  This is meant to include the reasons for natural theology.

From as early as Barth's Romans, Barth's actualistic understanding of revelation (dialectic of unveiling/veiling) and then ontology followed a Kantian framework (based, for example, on the neo-Kantianism of the early 20th century from thinkers like Hermann Cohen).  Barth's actualism moved him to historicize the being-act of God in his doctrine of election.  McCormack writes that "God's eternal election of himself to be God 'for us' in Jesus Christ is an act in which God constitutes his being as a being for historical existence."  Here Barth is close to Hegel except that "this act of Self-determination was a free act on the part of God, not a necessary one."

What McCormack illustrates is that Barth worked under a modern framework with his basis in history, ontology and rejection of classical metaphysics.  Even when he wrote against Schleiermacher, Kant and Hegel it was on the level of modern concepts and not a total postmodern rejection.  I am finding that the more I understand the 19th century thinkers the more I understand Barth.  As Barth warned in his later thought, even though he once said No to the19th century, one needs to understand what went awry and not be totally dismissive as seen in some conservative or postmodern readings.  I think one of the real weaknesses of American theology is the utter lack of comprehension of modern thought especially in Kant, Hegel, and Schelling (which is why Zizek is important in his rehabilitation of them).  Some attempt to make the jump to the postmodern not knowing what the postmodern thinkers are even contending against. 

One of my goals in life is to write a historiography book based on this reading of Barth which includes a substantial input from the German idealists, some German-Jewish thinkers of the late 19th century and Zizek.

In the next part I will deal with McCormack's definition of the "Orthodox".

Fall History classes and Theology Fail

One of the Fall classes I will be teaching is Historiography. So far I have a few books planned out and a number of essays/journal articles for the class ( a lot of new stuff so I am excited to try it out especially on reading Agamben). The aim of the class is to teach the writing of History and also to help the students prepare their own writing project by doing a historiographical survey.

I think I have been a historian by heart more than a theologian. One of the themes without a solid answer is the tension between concepts (metaphysical, philosophical or theological) and the historical context. Theology has at times rubbed me the wrong way because it seems to deal with a discussion in the clouds totally divorced from history. Now the other side of this coin is that if you go too forward with the historical context then the charge of relativism is leveled at the historicist. But it's that Nietzschean suspicion of concepts that I think are more than ever necessary as we try to work out or at least live within this tension.

On a side note, I just recently had a paper rejected that I wrote on Barth and Zizek on the human subject. This response reminded me of a similar one I had at community college when my essay was read in front of the class as an example of a crappy paper (this was especially enlightening after having my essays from a previous class published). Still, it taught me to write for an audience and to keep working on the craft. So the criticism boiled down to "this is a graduate paper, with all its promises and faults" because it ended up being more of a survey than a critical piece. What I might end up doing with this paper is to see Zizek as radicalizing a Barthian stance especially as I would classify both as part of the Hegelian tradition since Zizek has a pragmatic use for theology.

So one of the issues that I'm having I posted on last week: finding my critical voice. I think the historian in me likes to layout the scholarship but the theologian in me has a hard time saying were I stand in this landscape. For example, I am at the point of figuring out my thesis and the fact that I have to boil it down to its smallest point is a little daunting. I have themes and ideas I have written about in the last 3 years but to completely commit to something is a little scary especially because it has to be new to scholarship. The point is that it is time to put the cards on the table and move away from the somewhat facile comparisons and start to boldly say: "I claim."

Barth and Badiou: The Risk of the Event

I'm literally killing 2 birds with 1 stone. First, I'm working through Church Dogmatics I:1 & I:2 in a doctoral Directed Reading with Dr. John Franke. So far, the reading and the conversations have been stimulating. I will also be reading the so-called Postmodern Barth books (Ward, Johnson, Andrews) as well. In light of these readings, I want to then have Barth dialogue with thinkers like Jean-Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, or Alain Badiou (I just had Barth dialogue with Zizek in a paper on theology/psychology).

I think that we might be past the postmodern or "religious turn" readings often associated with Levinas and Derrida. This is why I plan to put Barth in conversation with the other figures because they are often thinking past Derrida and Levinas (as well as Heidegger).

Second, I need to get ready for my posting for the Karl Barth Blog coming up in July. I will be putting Barth in conversation with Badiou. I wrote a paper for a Theological Method's seminar led by Nancey Murphy on Barth and Badiou on the Event. There are some nice connections but also some clear differences. My goal is to look for the actual connecting points. There have been a number of books recently published that are starting to consider Badiou's Paul book. But more about that later... The idea for my current seminar is to look at Badiou's critique of the turn to language and otherness and see if Barth would connect with him. We shall see if this is successful.

By the way, notice how grandfatherly Badiou and Barth both look in the pictutres. I hope I look that hugable!

Why I ENJOY Zizek!

If you know anything about the Jimenez personality, we oftentimes get absorbed into texts, movies and personalities. For example, if you know my brother within ten seconds you will know his undying love for everything Phantom of the Opera.

However, ever since my brother referenced Zizek to me from a critical theory class he took at Biola, I simply can not get enough of this guy. What is the appeal? A lot of people just don't get him or think he is a passing fad. Well, I think there are a number of things appealing about him (so much so that I am trying to fit him into my doctoral dissertation with Barth; I'll keep you posted on how that is going).

First, part of the appeal is Zizek's enjoyment of pop culture which matches my own. I am a pop culture junkie. The second appeal is his use of humor in his talks and books. He oftentimes has to start a sentence with "No, no...I'm deadly serious." He has to say this because the audience or the reader is too busy laughing at his funny but true criticism.

Third, he takes theology seriously. Since I consider myself a card carrying Barthian, I love Zizek's turn to theology and what he calls the monstrosity of Christ. Christocentrism!!! Of course, the real Barth would probably blush at reading Zizek's take on Christ, but perhaps not (is it too Hegelian?-which I don't mind too much). Still, the fact that he is trying to read the Christian tradition in a radical way may be the first step in waking Christians up from either being too seeker friendly/postmodern or too conservative.

Fourth, his comments on ideology. His psychoanalytic/philosophical work is top notch. In fact, it is probably stronger than his theological musings. I think he is notoriously honest about out "post-ideological/postmodern" situation. There is much food for thought about his idea that everything has to be interpreted. That is, in one sense, the freedom we gained after the Reformation.

Finally, the way he can get away with giving lectures in a sloppy t-shirt that exposes his chest hair. I hope I can boast of the day that hundreds of graduate students will pack a lecture hall to hear me ramble on about Barth, Dostoevsky and Zizek all the while my own chest hair flows from the opening of my shirt.

Michael Jimenez