Barth's Nietzschean View of History

I am half way done with Richard E. Burnett's book Karl Barth's Theological Exegesis.  The main reason I am reading this book is because he spends a fair amount of time describing what Barth's reading style (his hermeneutics) is like.  He does this by seeing Barth's Romans (I and II) as breaking from the hermeneutical tradition of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey and also the higher criticism of his contemporaries.

The Eureka moment I had is when Burnett pointed out that Barth quotes (in his unpublished preface to Romans) Nietzsche's book The Use and Abuse of History.   Here is the quote (see page 114):

"You may only interpret the past out of the highest power of the present: only in the strongest efforts of your noblest qualities will you divinize what in the past is great, worth knowing and preserving.  Like through like!    Or else you will pull the past down to yourself!  It is the mature and preeminent man who writes history.  He that has not passed through some greater and nobler experience than his contemporaries will be incapable of interpreting the greatness and nobility of the past. The voices of the past speak in oracles; and only the master of the present and the architect of the future can hope to decipher their meaning."

This helps one of my recent points (which is probably not too original) that Barth follows in the genealogy with Nietzsche's and Burckhardt's school of history.  For these three, they held a skeptical view of the progressive reading of history at the end of the nineteenth century, and they wanted a separation between science (its appeal to objective, detachment) and the other disciplines in the humanities.  Following this quote, Barth appeals to Nietzsche in the way the dynamic between the past and present is important for practicing history; thus, their is no detachment with regard to the past.

Barth's and Zizek's little Hegeling: Dialectic with no Synthesis

Hegel is making a little comeback in some circles. He is an extraordinary thinker. However, most consider him the guy who collapses all differences into an all-encompassing identity. The post-structuralist philosophers attacked this Hegelian form where the dialectic started with a thesis then dealt with its antithesis only to become resolved by a synthesis. It is such a neat, tidy system.

Theologians have resisted the way Hegel seemed to move the act-being of God into a progressive movement within human consciousness (that erases transcendence). Barth had a professed love/hate relationship with Hegel. First, he admitted loving to do a little Hegeling. However, second, Barth ridicules Hegel for his bombastic attempt to encompass all thought to human reason. Most of Barth's commentators notice this love/hate relationship as well. Since Barth seemed to reject the modern tradition (which led into liberal theology) then he mostly has no place for Hegel.

Nevertheless, what if Slavoj Zizek is right that Hegel has no neat and tidy synthesis? Zizek writes that "far from being a story of its progressive overcoming, dialectics is for Hegel a systematic notation of the failure of all such attempts-- 'absolute knowledge' denotes a subjective position which finally accepts 'contradiction' as an internal condition of every identity. In other words, Hegelian 'reconciliation' is not a 'panlogicist' sublation of all reality in the Concept but a final consent to the fact that the Concept is 'not-all'." Here Zizek rejects the textbook presentation of Hegel that past thinkers like Kojeve presented.

What I claim is that as Zizek's Hegel leads to human knowledge that embraces negativity, does not Barth's veiled/unveiled dialectic lead to the same conclusion? Many of the commentators, in light of McCormack's work, note that Barth never did abandon his dialectic. Barth pronounces a dialectic Yes/No to all human thought. There is grace and judgment that must stay in tension. Thus, Barth rejects both a synthesis and a diastasis when it comes to philosophical/theological thought.

It is clear that Barth is not a deconstructionist in that there is still a veiled content to his theology supplied by the revelation of Christ, the Word of God. But even this supplied, external revelation is presented as a veiled/unveiled dialectic. So one can move forward in doing theology and philosophy but it will always have a pinch of negativity to it; I would say that there is only so much of the infinite that we the finite can take. Even when Barth moves ahead with his wonderful doctrine of election, which has grace at its center, he still must pronounce a No to the way we have handled this calling or tried to cover over this grace with structures of the No-God.

So, when commentators write that Barth's dialectic is not Hegelian because it does not have a synthesis, one might reply that Zizek's Hegel might be closer to Barth than he would have liked. In short, when Barth wrote that Hegel is the Protestant Thomas Aquinas and that the future may belong to him, he may have been more right than he knew.

Natural Law/Aquinas...Why Not Hegel?

Some recent conversations and readings i have been exposed to seem to be saying the same thing that what we need now in Christian theology in light of postmodern relativism and religious fundamentalism is a return to the natural law tradition especially seen in Thomas Aquinas. It is a leap backward that is trying to ground a "religious" tradition (I believe) without sounding all that religious. It is just "philosophical" theology or political thought that has worked and will keep us grounded.

There is obviously a place for philosophical theology. We are doing it anyway whether we try to temper it with a little Barthian withdrawal or not. So a number of writers are trying to update Barth's work via Aquinas especially in the realm of ethics. My response is...why not Hegel?

Hegel is more suited for this than Aquinas. He does theology AFTER THE ENLIGHTENMENT! There is (according to Zizek) a certain sense where philosophy hits the road with Kant and Hegel (not with Plato and Aristotle). I just don't buy into the whole we need to go back before the nominalists took over theory (see Radical Orthodoxy). And besides, Hegel does a lot of theology (theology that is rather heterodox but theology nonetheless).

Bruce McCormack has noted how much more Hegelian Barth becomes since CD II:2 and especially in CD IV:1. Still, Barth does not go all the way. Yet, some Hegelians will claim Barth wants his cake and to eat it to when he argues for the freedom/necessity of God's acts.

When it comes to ethics I am beginning to see the wisdom of framing them in the McCormack/Nimmo school via on God's act of election and of thus being a Being-in-act. It is via Christ's act as a Real Human that we know who God is because of what Christ did in History as mediated by the Spirit. Does not our ethics flow from the victory of Christ as revealed by the Spirit? The calling of us as being in Christ (The Elector/Elected) illustrates that the Spirit is mediating between us and God and between each other. The command ethics are first framed by the gospel of grace in Christ. Again, following Zizek, Christ did the work!-that's revelation. Now you who know your election, act by this command.

Barth himself in his Hegel essay claims that Hegel is the Protestant Aquinas, and I am starting to think if we want to continue in the protestant stream we need Hegel as a guide.

Summary of Barth's ethics: Ethics is election

First summary of looking at Barth's ethics: One can only do ethics in light of our election in Christ. For Barth, Christ is the Electing/Sanctifying God and the Elected/Sanctified Human that I beleive St. Paul says we find our place in. thus, any type of ethics must be based off this "covenantal ontology". By being-in-act as both the Elector and the Elected, Christ followed the "command" of God in "humility" and "obedience". Thus, when Barth later talks about ethics following the "command of God" for humans it is in the light of God's own humility that was added on through Christ.

Adorno and Potential Questions for Barth's Positivism

The influence of the nineteenth century thinker Soren Kierkegaard was extremely important for figures like Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth. Barth uses Kierkegaard's thought, which places a humongous gap between God and humanity, as a context for speaking about revelation coming in from on high to interrupt and judge human knowledge. Now the dynamic attitude of this is like Theodor Adorno's concept of constellation where critical thought allows sudden insights of different phenomena; Adorno was famously pessimistic about the rationalization behind much human thought. However, Adorno's has a immanent critique that would actually distrust Barth's move (see Brittain's Adorno and Theology).

Because, for Adorno, any talk of God as a wholly other betrays the divinity as an abyss. In short, Barth and other dialectical theologians escape from history and concrete analysis by keeping the traditional terms of theology intact. This even led Walter Benjamin to claim that Barth is hiding behind the language of Kierkegaard's existentialism to thus return to the "enchanted circle" of idealistic thought in the language of a positive revelation.

On the other hand, Kenneth Surin in his The Turnings of Darkness and Light (see pages 180–200) in a chapter entitled "Contempus Mundi and the disenchantment of the world: Bonhoeffer's 'Discipline of the Secret' and Adorno's 'Strategy of Hibernation'," sees Barth's move as a potential positive especially against Bonhoeffer's move to see a connection between revelation and saved creation. Barth, of course, sees a disjunction.

Surin claims Barth's theological deconstruction of human thought matches up with Adorno's historico-philosophical deconstruction. Adorno's negative dialectics keeps a diastasis between reality as it seems and what its potentiality is which fits with Barth's own diastasis with revelation versus the world. Surin notes how Adorno had criticized or would even critique Barth's somewhat naive understanding of positive revelation, yet Barth's diastasis makes Barth a thinker of suspicion in line with Adorno and actually against Bonhoeffer's somewhat ambiguous and naive correspondence theory.

Still, in light of this study and others, I am really wrestling with the "positive revelation" from transcendence that touches down here. I am mulling over critiquing this idea in some way through Delueze or some other thinker especially as it regards Barth's ethics.

Barth as an artistic follower of Mozart

Just recently finished Isolde Andrews' book Deconstructing Barth which compares Derrida's idea of the gift with Barth's economy of salvation. It was a creative way to view Barth because Andrews makes the point that modern theologies/philosophies attempt to create a nice, organized, neat system runs into problems when it tries to read Barth's works. Barth, in essence, like Derrida, leaves the inconsistencies, complexities and gaps in place in the texts in order to point out how we do not have a holistic view of things (223). In short, he creates a system of theology that is against any type of system much like Derrida does when he uses deconstruction.

The book ends on a high note when Andrews looks at the creative ability of Barth that he gets from Mozart (see pages 220-226). She writes: "Barth's general inspiration, like Mozart's music, emerges as Barth himself recognized, from the interaction of 'unconscious ideas and conscious methodology.'" This leads Andrews to say it is better to read Barth as an "artist rather than a scientist (221)." A scientist wants a final, complete word on a subject, whereas an artist creates and leaves room for further movement in life and in the life of a text. In short, Barth views things from the vantage point of an event.

I think there might be room here to see an event in line with Gilles Deleuze's understanding of it even though it is obviously close to Derrida's understanding of it (though I think Barth's event moves from above to bellow, whereas Deleuze's moves from below to wherever). Thus, Andrews suggests: "What Barth 'hears' is the trace of the event of God made man in the representation of the Gospel stories.... Barth merely, like a fine artist or his beloved Mozart, sets out in human language that which he hears the scripture saying, knowing that, like a musical work, the surprises, changes in key, rhythm, arguments must be heard then accepted or rejected as they are, regardless of whether the sound clashes at times or if it goes against conventions of musical taste (223)."

Barth: Philosophy's Place is not in Apologetics!

One of the main points of contention that is evident between Barth and Brunner is over the use of philosophy. Brunner had a view toward the world in that he wanted to use philosophy in order to combat various manifestations he thought did not fit within his theology. Sometimes this might be what he called "journalistic" theology or "eristics". It is basically a combative view in the form of using philosophy as apologetics. He believed the prevailing secularism in Europe was a starting point for the church to meet "modern human beings" in their own place and on their own terms.

Barth, on the other hand, thought that theology should have its own space to operate (starting with God's revelation). In short, that one of the problems with theology is when it becomes shaped by a philosophy. Now Barth is often misunderstood at times in thus rejecting philosophy. This he does not do. Here are a few points of what he actually does:

1. There is no such thing as "natural" reason as a first stop before then approaching theology. The point of contact that natural reason is supposedly set up to lead one to the promised land in essence cannot get you anywhere.
2. One should practice the dialectical art of thinking in response to the veiling and unveiling of the event of revelation. This is a continual act because there is no synthesis in Barth's dialectic.
3. Philosophy is to be used as a challenge to theology. We cannot take a triumphalist view toward secular thinkers but should instead listen to what they have to say on their own terms. Much Christian thought, for example, bring out a straw-man Nietzsche or Derrida just to show how bankrupt their thought is in comparison to their theology. If anyone has read Barth, one will see that he learned a lot from atheist/secular thinkers (still, he was not always consistent about this) by listening to their criticisms with open ears.

Not Just Natural Theology for Barth and Brunner: A Problem at the Start

Been speed reading through John W. Hart's Karl Barth Vs. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution of a Theological Alliance, 1916-1936 the last couple of days. The thesis behind the book is that there were methodological problems between the two theologians before the major break over the doctrine of natural theology.

Now I always understood the break in its historical context (unlike many people who simply think Barth overreacted). Barth's Nein! was motivated in reaction to the German Christians utilization of natural theology in backing up the Nazis as a religious event (this is all around the early 1903s in Germany). In some sense, Brunner's essay was simply bad timing and that is why Barth pounced on it. Nevertheless, one should not think it was just this context that led Barth to utterly despise natural theology. He already came to the conclusion that it was bankrupt and in opposition toward his theology of revelation.

Hart's book shows how Barth had always suspected that Brunner did not really understand him and that they were always somewhat at odds. One example is over the handling of Schleiermacher (who I have learned to respect as a thinker on his own merits). Brunner attacks Schleiermacher in a triumphalist sort of way. Barth, on the other hand, has a weird love/hate relationship with Schleiermacher's thought, but loves the man. One of the arguments between Barth and Brunner are over Schleiermacher's sermons. Barth says you will not understand him really without diving into his sermons, but Brunner does not buy this option.

The other thing featured in the book is just how needy Brunner is and how Barth is a little bugged by it. Here is great quote by Barth: "Do I have to write a commentary to every postcard? Dear friend: take everything in humor and innocence in which it was meant. And above all: don't take me-and yourself-so bloody seriously."

Finally, I actually read "natural" theology through a more poststructuralist mode. In short, there is no such thing as "natural" for us the human viewers. Everything is seen through symbolization. When I get to this part of the book I will post on what I consider Barth's aversion to both natural theology and humanism-which I am currently trying to find links in Zizek's thought.

Quick thought on Parousia

Just read this direct quote from the Wikepedia article on Deconstruction/Christianity/ Jean Luc Nancy: "For Nancy, because Christ is central to the formation of value and meaning in Christianity; because parousia is an announcement of a Christ to come; and because the promised return of Christ involves the return of a person who lived in the past, then Christianity as a framework of thought supports the notion that 'traces' of the non-present (i.e. past and future) are constitutive of the present."

I wonder how and if this connects with Karl Barth's threefold understanding of the parousia? The fact that the Resurrected (1st parousia) and the Glorified (3rd parousia) is radically with us through the Spirit after Pentecost (2nd parousia). Both non-present traces are crucial in our present understanding of Christ. You cannot understand the parousia without all three.

I have been debating on whether or not to engage Nancy. I have a couple of recent edited books on political thinking that he contributes; I guess after those I can decide on whether or not to read some of his other philosophy.

Barth's Dialectic: 1 of the hinges

I absolutely loved Terry Cross's book on Barth's dialectic in the Doctrine of God where he makes a good case, following Bruce McCormack, that Barth never simply abandoned his dialectical thinking after the Anselm book.

Cross notes that Barth has a number of uses for the dialectic, but what I thought was most helpful was the way he used the idea of the door and hinge to explain Barth's thinking. The door is the Word of God. The hinges are analogy of faith (correspondence) and the dialectic. In fact, the dialectic keeps the use of the analogy of faith humble and human. So even though Barth moves more toward the fact that the God-Man, in the historical movement of Christ, fixes the gap between humans and God, the human side of that fact is still veiled. Because God has spoken humans can now speak of God, yet in a dialectical way; thus, I would say we are commanded to be heralds and witnesses to the Event of revelation, yet we are in essence limited witnesses.

Barth seems to have never abandoned the idea of the veiling/unveiling of God's self-revelation. In other words, God reveals and is hidden in revelation. Even in the person/work of Christ this is a fact. For example, the primary mover of revelation in the life of Christ is the resurrection where the "It is finished" of the cross is revealed to Christ's followers. Without the resurrection, we would be in the dark that God had reconciled the world on the cross. Now Badiou, for instance, sees the resurrection on its own merit without a need of dialectic; the Event of the resurrection fashions a new subject like Paul in light of its revelatory action. Zizek rightly criticizes Badiou's optimistic thought for being too much of a theology of glory without the dialectic of the cross. I think Barth, because of the dialectic, is not in need of such chastening.

So Barth's theological theme that grace is revealed through Jesus Christ is a consistent message throughout his corpus. The dialectic serves as a way that limits the teleological movement found in the Christian narrative. There is definitely some end and goal to the work of Christ, yet we are merely witnesses to it and our job is to be open and faithful to that witness and not to try to bring into fruition by our own merits.

Ramadan & Barth: Orthodox & Modern?

I am finishing up Gregory Baum's book on The Theology of Tariq Ramadan and have thoroughly enjoyed it. I really like the conversational style of the book and the openness the author has toward Ramadan while having his theology relate to specifically the Catholic theology of Vatican II.

It seems one of the problems that people have with Ramadan is that he seems to be (like Bruce McCormack labeled Karl Barth) both Orthodox and Modern. In other words, both Barth and and now Ramadan work within the breakthrough of modernity (they use context, history, critical thought) while at the same time being faithful to their tradition and its founding scriptures. In other words, they are part of the Reformist tradition. The point is not to destroy the faith of the fathers but continue to be faithful to it by always reforming.

Liberals, Fundamentalists and Radicals really despise this position because it is not "faithful" enough to their own perspective. For a fundamentalist, they are too "liberal" in buying into the modern framework. For Liberals, they are too conservative for being to faithful to the past traditions and interpretations and their religious communities (better to have a vague spirituality). For Radicals, they are too conservative because they haven't deconstructed the whole religious paradigm and embraced pure secularism or atheism.

Instead a reformist is always looking to reform the current faith to be both faithful to their sources and the community of believers while at the same time open to the voice of God for changes that should be made today especially when the tradition is either silent or not clear on a matter. For example, Barth wrote particularly to the Church because they are the witnesses of God while Ramadan targets Western Muslims; there is a clear particularity in their target audience yet not denying their general readership as well. The point is that they want to be faithful to the real communities of faith that ascribe to their faith. Thus, when it comes to modernity, it is a mixed bag of blessings and problems; it is up to the reformist to see where the faith can value modern ideas while at the same time be critical as well. It is to say, yes, some of modernity is good because of its liberating dimensions, yet modernity and secularism is not our God; there is only one God and God is one. This is what I see both theologians doing...